The Marginal Impact of ENGOs in Different Types of Democratic Systems by Böhmelt, Tobias et al.
The marginal impact of ENGOs in different
types of democratic systems
TOB IA S BÖHMELT
1, 2*, THOMAS BERNAUER2 AND VALLY KOUB I 3
1Department of Government Colchester, University of Essex, UK
2Center for Comparative and International Studies Zurich, ETH Zurich, Switzerland
3Department of Economics Bern Switzerland, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
Conventional wisdom suggests that environmental non-governmental organizations
(ENGOs) play a major role in pushing states towards more ambitious environmental
policies. However, demonstrating that this presumption is in fact true is rather difficult,
because the same system structures of democracies that may create more opportunities for
ENGO activities are also, on their own, conducive to better environmental policies. This
leaves open the possibility that the additional (marginal) impact of ENGOs on policy
making is smaller than presumed. In trying to disentangle these effects, this paper examines
the influence of ENGOs contingent on key structural characteristics of democratic systems.
We develop the argument that presidential systems with a plurality electoral rule per se tend
to provide more environmental public goods, which induces a smaller marginal impact of
ENGOs. Conversely, parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral
rule are likely to provide fewer environmental public goods, which allows for a larger
marginal impact of ENGOs. We find robust empirical support for these hypotheses in
analyses that focus on the ratification behavior of 75 democracies vis-à-vis 250 international
environmental agreements in 1973–2002.
Keywords: environmental non-governmental organizations; international environmental
politics; parliamentary systems; presidential systems; plurality voting; proportional
representation
Introduction
Environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) have become highly
visible in decision making from local to global levels since the 1970s. An increasing
body of research examines how ENGOs participate in policy making, either indir-
ectly (e.g. via lobbying or campaigns) or directly (e.g. by helping governments to
design and implement environmental regulations) (e.g. Betsill and Corell, 2001;
Corell and Betsill, 2001; see also Chayes and Chayes, 1993: 204; Raustiala, 1997;
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Roberts et al., 2004; von Stein, 2008; Böhmelt
and Betzold, 2013).
The general expectation in this literature and also in policy circles is that ENGOs
play a major role in pushing governments towards more ambitious environmental
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policies at all political levels.1 For example, ENGOs can enhance procedural
legitimacy by promoting greater transparency and better representation of other-
wise marginalized societal interests in policy formulation and implementation
(see Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu, 2002; Steffek and Ferreti, 2009). Moreover,
transboundary environmental problems have become more complex and more
severe. ENGOs then help monitor state commitments, facilitate signaling between
governments and constituents, or provide expertise and policy advice to govern-
ments in areas characterized by uncertainty over cost efficiency, political feasibility,
and ecological impacts of particular policy options (e.g. Raustiala, 1997, 2001).
In turn, according to the resource exchange perspective (Lehmbruch, 1977;
Baccaro and Simoni, 2008; Dür, 2008; Christiansen et al., 2010), ENGOs gain
influence over policymakers, which allows them to shape policy outputs according
to their own preferences. Hence, both types of ENGO functions are presumed to
act in the same direction, namely towards making the resulting policies ‘more
environmental-friendly’, thus more acceptable to citizens and, in turn, making vote-
seeking policymakers more willing to adopt such policies (Risse-Kappen 1994,
1995; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Biermann and Gupta, 2011; Bernauer and Betzold,
2012; Dryzek, 2012; Bernauer and Gampfer, 2013). At the international level,
Roberts et al. (2004: 39) conclude that ‘the number of [E]NGOs in a nation appears
virtually synonymous with its likelihood to participate in environmental treaties’.
At national levels, Binder and Neumayer (2005) show that ENGO strength is
systematically associated with better environmental performance of states. Thus,
‘most scholars agree that [E]NGOs do make a difference’ (Gulbrandsen and
Andresen, 2004: 54).
The overall conclusion from this research, which attributes at least part of the
trend towards more stringent environmental policies to ENGO influence, seems
quite convincing both theoretically and empirically. We build on this research and
add to it by examining the possibility that ENGO influence is contingent on specific
types of political system characteristics. The existing research controls for political
system characteristics in an additive sense, that is by including some political system
characteristics in explanatory models in which ENGOs are the key independent
variable. However, this research neither theorizes on nor empirically examines
whether the impact of ENGOs might depend on particular political system
characteristics.
Analysing contingent effects of ENGOs is useful from a theoretical point of view
and empirically. Theoretically, it helps overcome a rather surprising disconnect
between two distinct literatures. First, there is the traditional literature on interest
groups, non-governmental organizations, and social movements in comparative
politics or political sociology (e.g. Kitschelt, 1986; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Della
Porta and Tarrow, 2004; Snow et al., 2004; Dryzek, 2012), which has emphasized
1 For a general overview of non-governmental groups’ lobbying influence, see for example Jordan et al.
(2004), Dür and De Bièvre (2007), or Baumgartner et al. (2009).
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political opportunity structures. Second, there is the political economy literature on
public goods provision that offers well-developed arguments connecting democratic
political system characteristics with variation in levels and types of public goods
provision (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Persson and Tabellini, 2003).
Empirically, this paper addresses an analytical challenge in the existing literature
on ENGOs and their impact on environmental policy making. This challenge
derives from the possibility that the same democratic political system structures that
may create more opportunities for the formation, activities, and influence of
ENGOs are also, on their own, conducive to better environmental policies. This
leaves us with the possibility that the additional (marginal) impact of ENGOs
on policy making could actually be smaller than presumed. Recent research by
Bernauer et al. (2013) points to this by arguing that the effect of ENGOs on inter-
national environmental cooperation is contingent on levels of democracy, and
that, paradoxically, the influence of ENGOs may be smaller in democracies than in
non-democracies. The main reason is that democracies tend to pursue better
environmental policies anyway, which implies that the additional (marginal) effect
of ENGOs in democracies is smaller relative to non-democracies. The empirical
findings in that paper are generally in line with our arguments developed here.
We pick up on the latter idea and unpack the ‘black box’ of democratic systems to
examine whether and how particular forms of democratic government and electoral
rules could mediate the influence of ENGOs on environmental policy. Specifically,
we argue that presidential systems with a plurality electoral rule per se tend to
providemore environmental public goods, which leads to a smaller marginal impact
of ENGOs. Conversely, parliamentary systems with a proportional representation
electoral rule are likely to provide fewer environmental public goods, which allows
for a larger marginal impact of ENGOs. We find robust empirical support for
these claims in analyses that focus on the ratification behaviour of 75 democracies
vis-à-vis 250 international environmental agreements in 1973–2002.
Theoretical framework: outline
ENGOs are usually mass membership organizations, representatives of voters, and,
thus, they shape public opinion and signal electoral preferences to policymakers (see
Böhmelt and Betzold, 2013). Through their diverse activities, ENGOs may have
considerable influence over both policy development processes and their outcomes
(Corell and Betsill, 2001; Corell, 2008). A large part of the literature examining
ENGOs and their activities documents the strategies used by these organizations to
influence environmental politics, and assesses the extent to which these strategies
are effective (for a more comprehensive discussion, see Betsill, 2006). First and with
regard to the typology of strategies, most scholars distinguish between insider and
outsider strategies (Beyers, 2004; Betsill, 2006). The former refer to a set of activities
that seek to affect policymakers directly via the provision of expert advice or policy
analysis. Corell and Betsill (2001: 87) emphasize here that ‘the provision of
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knowledge and information is the key ENGO resource for influence’ (see also
Gerdung, 2004; Betsill and Corell, 2008). The latter aims at creating pressure from
the outside by shaping public opinion (e.g. Gulbrandsen and Andresen, 2004;
Betsill, 2006).
Against this background, the more general literature on interest groups, non-
governmental organizations, and social movements, which has strong roots in
comparative politics and political sociology, highlights the importance of political
opportunity structures (e.g. Kitschelt, 1986; Risse-Kappen 1994, 1995; Keck and
Sikkink, 1998; Della Porta and Tarrow, 2004; Snow et al., 2004; Dryzek, 2012):
groups’ and activists’ impact on policy making is expected to vary, depending on
whether specific properties of a political system provide more (or fewer) opportu-
nities for them to form, operate, and gain access and influence in political decision-
making processes.2 Interestingly, political economy research as another stream in
the literature inter alia provides us with well-developed arguments on democratic
system characteristics and variation in public goods provision, but does not con-
sider opportunity structures, and how they might affect interest groups and non-
governmental organizations (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Persson and
Tabellini, 2003). This work has primarily focused on the analysis of direct effects
of political system characteristics on levels of public goods provision, such as
environmental protection. The distinctions between presidential and parliamentary
systems, on the one hand, and proportional and plurality electoral rule, on the other
hand, both of which are also salient in the comparative politics literature (e.g. Lijphart,
1984, 1999; Boix, 1999; Powell, 2000), have been at the center of attention in this
context. We connect these two literatures to construct an argument on how ENGO
influence may vary depending on specific political system characteristics.
Our starting point is that environmental policy making can be conceptualized as a
problem of public goods provision, where the public good to be generated is meant to
serve very large parts of a given society. Examples include clean air andwater, aswell as
policy instruments such as international environmental agreements whose purpose is to
enable or facilitate the provision of public goods. We link this outcome variable to
political system characteristics, that is presidential vs. parliamentary systems and
plurality vs. proportional electoral rule. The number of effective political parties, which
varies systematically across these system characteristics, will also play a role in our
theoretical setup. Afterwards, we bring ENGOs into the explanatory model to identify
under what types of political system conditions ENGOs are likely to have a larger
(or smaller) marginal impact on environmental public goods provision.
Figure 1 illustrates the expectations derived from our theory. It is indicated that
increasing ENGO leverage, which we define as the capacity to exert influence, has a
positive effect on environmental public goods provision in all types of democratic
political systems. They also suggest, however, that the ENGO impact is larger in
2 It may be worth noting here that different types of organizations might face different political
opportunities, even if the ‘general’ opportunity structure is constant.
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parliamentary systems with proportional electoral rule than in presidential systems
with plurality voting. In the following, we develop the theoretical model step-by-step.
Democratic forms of government, electoral rules, and public goods provision
A large body of the existing literature accounting for variation in (environmental)
public goods provision focuses on the broad distinction between democratic and
non-democratic systems (e.g. Congleton, 1992; Payne, 1995; McGuire and Olson,
1996; Lake and Baum, 2001; Neumayer, 2002; Fredriksson et al., 2005; Ward,
2008; Bernauer et al., 2010). Some work also offers more nuanced explanations
that concentrate on variation within the two broader system types (e.g. Lizzeri and
Persico, 2001; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002; Rogowski and Kayser, 2002; Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2003; Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Scruggs, 2003; Fredriksson and
Millimet, 2004a, b; Fredriksson and Wollscheid, 2007; Bernauer and Koubi, 2009;
Fredriksson et al., 2010; Cao and Ward, 2011; Fiorino, 2011; Ward and
Cao, 2012). Bernauer and Koubi (2009), for example, distinguish presidential and
parliamentary systems and find that the former perform better than the latter in
providing for cleaner air. Moreover, Fredriksson and Millimet (2004a) study the
impact of electoral rules and report that democracies with proportional electoral
systems have stricter environmental policies than democracies with plurality voting
(see also Fredriksson et al., 2010).
Figure 1 The expected marginal environmental non-governmental organization (ENGO)
impact in different political systems.
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Following this literature, we use democratic political system type and electoral
rule as the principal explanatory variables in our baseline model accounting for
variation in environmental public goods provision. We then bring in the effective
number of political parties before integrating ENGOs into this framework. Two key
characteristics of democratic political systems, which are very prominent in the
comparative politics literature, serve as our starting point: the form of government
(presidential vs. parliamentary systems) and the type of electoral rule (plurality vs.
proportional electoral rule) (e.g. Lijphart, 1984, 1999; Boix, 1999; Powell, 2000).
We focus on these two characteristics, because there is strong agreement among
scholars that they have important implications for policy making and public policies.
The existing literature has produced contradictory theoretical arguments in this
respect, however.
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) rely on their selectorate theory and claim that
different forms of democracy are characterized by different sizes of the winning
coalition. They argue that presidential systems and plurality electoral rules, which
require a large winning coalition, provide more public goods than parliamentary
and proportional representation systems, which require a smaller winning coalition.
The reason is that, in order to survive politically in presidential systems with plur-
ality rule where the winning coalition is large, leaders have to implement policies
that benefit a very large part of society; and public goods typically provide such
widespread benefits.
In contrast, Persson et al. (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2004) argue
that legislators of the majority coalition form the government and determine public
policy in parliamentary systems. To sustain their electoral support, they need to
promote the joint interests of their voters and, hence, concentrate government
spending on public goods.Moreover, Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2004) claim that
the size of the minimal coalition of voters required to win an election is larger in
proportional representation than in ‘winner-takes-all’ (plurality) systems, because a
party needs around 50% of the national vote rather than 25%. Consequently, it is
argued that parliamentary systems with proportional representation are likely to
provide more public goods (see also Austen-Smith, 2000; Lizzeri and Persico, 2001;
Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2003).
The empirical evidence for these competing claims is also characterized by
ambiguity. For instance, Rogowski and Kayser (2002), Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2003), and Bernauer and Koubi (2009) find that presidential systems provide more
public goods. On the other hand, Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2003) obtain evi-
dence that presidential regimes tend to spend less on public goods; and Persson and
Tabellini (2004: 27) report that parliamentary systems exhibit larger welfare
spending than presidential democracies. With respect to electoral rules, Persson and
Tabellini (1999, 2003) find that plurality-voting systems lead to a lower supply of
public goods, while proportional representation systems are likely to spend more on
public goods according to Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) or Fredriksson and Millimet
(2004a, b). We submit that the theoretical and empirical ambiguity just discussed
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might be reduced if we consider the competitive situation policymakers face, which
is reflected in the political party system and, in particular, in the effective number of
parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).3
The effective number of parties and public goods provision
We follow the common assumption that parties structure themselves, develop
electoral strategies, and shape policies to maximize their vote shares (Downs, 1957).
Hence, depending on the form of government and the type of electoral rule, parties
emerge and develop in distinct ways that allow them tomeet the electoral imperative
of vote maximization.
Presidential systems with plurality voting rule are likely to be characterized by
fewer effective parties, in many cases two-party systems. In contrast, parliamentary
democracies with a proportional election rule usually have more effective parties.
Duverger (1972), for instance, contends that the nature of the electoral system
shapes the party system. He argues that ‘a majority vote on one ballot is conducive
to a two-party system and proportional representation is conducive to a multiparty
system’ (Duverger, 1972: 23; for a critique of this claim, however, see Riker, 1976,
1982). This means that plurality systems support fewer parties and are designed
to bestow government control on a single party, which is also a characteristic of
presidential democracies (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Lijphart, 1999). Because
the likelihood of a coalition government is rather small in such systems, political
parties must maximize their vote share to implement their desired policies. With
fewer parties, vote-maximizing locations in the political space are typically near the
center, that is the median voter (Downs, 1957).
Conversely, proportional representation systems support more parties, which
raises the chances for coalition governments that are usually characteristic of
parliamentary systems. Still, parties with smaller vote shares have the possibility to
influence government policies. A larger number of political parties also limits their
spatial mobility and results in vote-maximizing positions of some parties away from
the political center (Downs, 1957).
Moreover, with regard to the form of government, presidential systems favour a
structure with fewer parties as well. The underlying argument focuses on the
instability of political decision making and ideological polarization (Mainwaring,
1993). Presidential systems typically lack mechanisms for assuring that the execu-
tive has a majority in the legislature. As a result, these systems are more prone
to minority governments and to status quo bias, that is ‘legislative deadlock’
(Mainwaring, 1993: 200). The form of government thus shapes ‘the equilibrium
number of parties’ (Persson et al., 2007: 2) as this deadlock becomes increasingly
unlikely with fewer parties in the system. In addition, due to the dominance of the
3 This pertains to the effective number of parties at the seats level according to the formula proposed by
Laakso and Taagepera (1979).
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executive (see also Lijphart, 1999: 138), presidential systems are frequently also char-
acterized by high entry barriers for new parties, which keep radical parties out of the
party system (Mainwaring, 1993: 200). This makes a multiparty system unlikely.
Empirical studies show that presidential and plurality rule systems indeed have
fewer effective parties. For example, Persson et al. (2007) find that proportional
representation rule leads to a more fragmented party system and, hence, a larger
effective number of parties (Lijphart, 1999: 165ff; see also Boix, 1999). To further
corroborate these results, which are important for our argument, we take data from
the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al., 2011). These data comprise
annual information for 23 democratic (OECD) countries between 1960 and 2009,
including information on the effective number of parties as specified by Laakso and
Taagepera (1979). We calculated annual mean values of this variable for pre-
sidential vs. parliamentary systems and plurality vs. proportional systems, and
plotted curves for 1973–2006.4 Figure 2 and 3 summarize the findings. Evidently,
the effective number of parties is higher in parliamentary systems and in systems
with proportional electoral rule. Using t-tests, we can also reject the null hypothesis
of equality for both curves in either figure.
The relationship between the effective number of parties and the provision of
public goods can now be placed into the context of our prior argument on political
system type, electoral rule, and public goods provision. We argue that presidential
systems with plurality voting are likely to provide more (environmental) public
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Figure 2 The effective number of parties by the form of government (1973–2006).
4 We use the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001) for data on form of
government and electoral rule (see also the research design sections below).
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goods, because electoral competition in these systems takes place among fewer
parties. In contrast, since parliamentary and proportional representation systems
are associated with a higher effective number of parties, they are likely to provide
fewer (environmental) public goods.
The underlying logic for these claims is the following: systems with fewer parties
create stronger incentives for competing political leaders to offer goods from which
a very large part of the selectorate can benefit, that is (environmental) public goods.
On the other hand, in systems with several or many parties that compete for poli-
tical power, rival political leaders are more likely to cater to particular segments of
the selectorate, both within election districts and nationally. Incentives to produce
public goods are thus weaker (Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004: 163; see also Cox,
1997; Persson and Tabellini, 1999). In the words of Chhibber and Nooruddin
(2004: 162), ‘the ability to win elections with lower percentages in multiparty
environments decreases the incentives for a party to mobilize support across all
social groups to the same degree when it faces only one other competitor’.5
ENGO influence contingent on political system characteristics: hypotheses
The final step in our theoretical framework brings ENGOs back into the model. We
argued above that presidential systems and plurality rule are associated with fewer
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Figure 3 The effective number of parties by electoral rule (1973–2006).
5 See Persson et al. (2000) for a counterargument. In view of these competing theoretical claims, the
empirical evidence will have to play the arbiter.
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effective parties. This structure creates stronger incentives for policymakers to
provide more (environmental) public goods – relative to parliamentary and pro-
portional systems, which tend to have more than two effective parties. When adding
ENGOs to this framework, we can derive empirical implications concerning the
marginal impact of ENGOs on states’ environmental public goods provision con-
tingent on democratic system characteristics.
As discussed, ENGOs are likely to influence environmental policy making and its
outcomes by contributing to procedural legitimacy in terms of greater transparency
and improved representation of otherwise politically less influential societal interests.
They also provide knowledge and expertise that may help policymakers to design
and implement more efficient and effective policies. These two types of ENGO
contributions, which are well documented in the literature (e.g. Betsill and Corell,
2008; Bernauer and Gampfer, 2013), are likely to enhance public support for more
ambitious environmental policies and to encourage vote-seeking policymakers to
adopt such policies.
For the reasons mentioned, the net impact of ENGOs is therefore likely to be
positive across different types of democratic political systems. That said, it is likely
to differ in strength depending on those political system characteristics that affect
public goods provision independent of ENGO influence. In countries whose poli-
tical system characteristics are more conducive to more ambitious environmental
policies, the relative impact of ENGOs will be smaller; on the other hand, it will be
larger in countries whose political system characteristics are less conducive to
environmental policies. This argument builds on Bernauer et al. (2013) who show
that the marginal impact of ENGOs on countries’ participation in international
environmental agreements is likely to be weaker in democracies, which tend to
pursue better environmental policies anyway. Hypotheses 1 and 2, as well as
Figure 1 above, summarize these theoretical expectations.
HYPOTHESIS 1: Presidential systems with plurality rule provide per se more
environmental public goods. This implies that the additional
(marginal) effect of ENGOs on environmental public goods
provision in such systems is likely to be smaller – compared with
parliamentary systems with a proportional electoral rule.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Parliamentary systems with proportional rule provide per se less
environmental public goods. This implies that the additional
(marginal) effect of ENGOs on environmental public goods
provision in such systems is likely to be larger – compared with
presidential systems with plurality rule.
Research design: dependent variable and methodology
While our theoretical arguments are quite generic and can apply to a wide range of
environmental public goods, systematic empirical testing requires a somewhat
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narrower focus. We decided to concentrate on countries’ choices with respect to
joining (or not joining) international environmental agreements. Future empirical
work will have to explore whether our theoretical arguments are also relevant to
other forms of environmental public goods provision.
Specifically, our dependent variable measures countries’ ratification behaviour
vis-à-vis a wide range of global environmental agreements. The reasons for focusing
on this outcome variable are the following. First, it may, of course, be the case that
some international environmental treaties are rather weak in terms of their ambition
level, or that particular countries join agreements without being able or willing to
fully implement the commitments set forth therein. This means that environmental
treaty ratification may be a somewhat incomplete measure for the level of envir-
onmental public goods provision by a given country. Nevertheless, formally enga-
ging in a legally binding international environmental agreement still constitutes a
strong signal on the part of government that it is committing to more ambitious
environmental policies relative to the status quo (see also Martin, 1993; Fearon,
1998; Leeds, 1999; Schneider and Urpelainen, 2013). At the very least, treaty rati-
fication is regarded by many scholars as a reasonably clear sign of governmental
attempts to engage in environmental public goods production (e.g. Bernauer et al.,
2013). Leinaweaver (2012: 3–4), for instance, notes that environmental treaty
ratification ‘greatly resembles what would be involved with the provision of other
public goods’. He also notes that ‘the ratification of these treaties represents a
binding pledge at the international level and domestic groups may view this favor-
ably because they recognize that domestic institutions do not bind the leader
very firmly, while international ones, as weak as they are, may provide a more
credible binding constraint […] compliance with ratified treaties may be assumed as
highly likely meaning that the promised environmental goods will be provided’
(Leinaweaver, 2012: 15).
Second, international environmental treaty ratification is a clearly observable
event that can be reliably measured over long time periods and for many countries.
Our approach also allows us to take into account such state behavior vis-à-vis a very
wide range of environmental policies that are covered by existing treaties.
The data for our dependent variable are taken from Bernauer et al. (2010).
Following the definition of ratifications in that study, different legal expressions
of formally joining a treaty, for example accession, are treated as equivalent to
ratification. Furthermore, treaties that may somewhat deal with environmental
issues only at the margins, but whose key purpose is not the environment were
dropped from the data. The data also omit agreements that were open for ratification
before 19736 and only include treaties that are open for ratification to all countries
globally (i.e. in principle, any country in the world must have the opportunity to ratify
an agreement; this excludes treaties that have a purely regional scope only). Since we
6 We cross-checked our findings by also including pre-1973 data (i.e. 1950–72), but the results do not
change in substantive ways.
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are interested in how variation in democratic institutions influences the presumed
positive effect of ENGO leverage on environmental public goods provision, we also
dropped countries that are not defined as democracies according to the dis-
aggregated democratic regime type data (Beck et al., 2001) described below, as well as
those states that have a democracy value of less than +7 according to the polity2
variable from the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers, 2013). The polity2 item,
ranging in [−10; +10] with the minimum pertaining to fully autocratic states and +10
representing ‘perfect’ democracies, captures a state’s level of democracy along three
dimensions: ‘the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can
express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second, the exis-
tence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third,
the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political
participation’ (Marshall and Jaggers, 2013: 14; see also Vreeland, 2008).
The unit of analysis is the agreement-country-year, that is each international
environmental treaty is paired with each democracy that could potentially ratify it
in a given year. An international environmental agreement enters the data as soon as
it becomes open (available) for ratification; and each agreement-country pair
remains in the data until the year when a given country ratifies this agreement.7Due
to these criteria, the data set used to test our theoretical argument covers 75
democracies and 250 international environmental treaties between 1973 and 2002.8
Table 1 lists the democracies in our sample.
The choice of statistical method – logistic regression models – derives from the binary
nature of our dependent variable (1 if a given country ratifies a given international
environmental agreement; 0 otherwise). Robust standard errors are clustered on each
agreement-country pair to account for intra-group correlations or other forms of cross-
sectional heterogeneity. Furthermore, we control for temporal dependencies by includ-
ing a ratification-years variable and different sets of cubic splines (Beck et al., 1998). This
approach acknowledges that a country’s propensity to ratify an international environ-
mental agreement might depend on corresponding choices in previous years.
Research design: core explanatory variables
The two hypotheses focus on three explanatory variables, that is ENGOs, the form
of government, and the type of electoral rule in democracies. First, we measure
ENGOs and their potential for political leverage by the number of national ENGOs
registered in a country (Fredriksson and Ujhelyi, 2006).9 The data for this variable
7 Keeping an agreement-country pair in the data set after ratification took place would bias our findings,
since this would imply that a country ratifies this treaty again and again in each subsequent year.
8 The time-period varies due to data limitations for most of our explanatory variables. While the model
without control variables, as discussed below, is based on data for the maximum period possible (1973–
2002), the model that includes all control variables is based on data for 1973–2000.
9 Due to the skewed distribution of this count item, we use the natural log. Before transforming the
variable, we add 1 to avoid taking the log of 0.
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(ENGO Leverage (ln)) are taken from Bernauer et al. (2013) and were originally
coded from information for 1973–2006 in the archives of the International Union
for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). The IUCN considers itself as ‘the world’s
largest and most important conservation network’, with a ‘mission to influence,
encourage, and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the integrity and
diversity of nature’ (IUCN, 2006). Its members include national and international
ENGOs, government agencies, and scientists from 181 countries. While the orga-
nization’s network extends to most countries in the world, the IUCN is essentially
an umbrella organization where membership is not mandatory and ENGOs do not
necessarily have to register. The data we use may thus omit some ENGOs, but this
measurement approach seems more systematic and efficient than collecting ENGO
data from other sources. We also believe that the IUCN’s large network of rela-
tionships with non-governmental organizations allows us to generate a reasonably
valid and reliable proxy for the potential political leverage of ENGOs (see also
Bernauer et al., 2013).10
Table 1. Countries (democracies) in sample, 1973–2002
Countries in sample (1973–2002)
Argentina India Paraguay
Australia Ireland Peru
Austria Israel Philippines
Belgium Italy Poland
Bolivia Jamaica Portugal
Botswana Japan Romania
Brazil Kenya Russia
Bulgaria Latvia Senegal
Canada Lesotho Slovak Republic
Chile Lithuania Slovenia
Colombia Madagascar South Africa
Costa Rica Malawi South Korea
Croatia Mali Spain
Cyprus Mauritius Sri Lanka
Denmark Mexico Sudan
Dominican Republic Moldova Sweden
Ecuador Mongolia Switzerland
El Salvador Netherlands Thailand
Fiji New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago
Finland Nicaragua Turkey
France Niger Ukraine
Greece Norway United Kingdom
Guatemala Pakistan United States
Honduras Panama Uruguay
Hungary Papua New Guinea Venezuela
10 Despite their ‘national’ characteristic, these ENGOs are involved in international environmental
politics – otherwise they would probably not interact with the IUCN.
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Having said that, the number of ENGOs from the IUCN data is obviously not a
perfect proxy for ENGOs’ capacity for political influence. For instance, there may
be many ENGOs registered in a country, but all of them might be small and weak.
Another possible objection is that in some cases fewer groups might mean that the
environmental lobby is better organized and, hence, better able to exert political
pressure (Fredriksson and Ujhelyi, 2006: 18). Following Fredriksson and Ujhelyi
(2006), we examined the own effect of our ENGO variable on treaty ratification as a
positive finding here would cut against this objection. In fact, we obtain robust
evidence for such a relationship (see also Bernauer et al., 2013). In line with that, the
ENGO variable’s positive correlation with measures like population or GDP per capita
also suggests that a larger number of ENGOs reflects a higher – and not a lower –
ability to organize political action (Fredriksson and Ujhelyi, 2006: 18). Furthermore,
note that we replaced the ENGO data used for the main analysis with data from an
alternative source. The robustness checks with these alternative data are reported in the
appendix (Supplementary Material), and the main results uphold.
Second, the type of democratic government, that is either presidential or
parliamentary, is measured with data from the 2010 edition of the World Bank’s
Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). According to this data set,
countries in which the legislature elects the chief executive are parliamentary
systems. Systems with presidents who are elected through popular vote, either
directly or by an electoral college (whose only function is to elect the political leader),
and where there is no prime minister, are classified as presidential. We created a
dichotomous variable (Presidential System Dummy) that receives a value of 1 in case a
country has a presidential system and the value of 0 if a country has a parliamentary
system. Systems that are not classified as either parliamentary or presidential, or those
cases that are categorized as ‘mixed regimes’, are omitted from the analysis.
Third, we operationalize the type of electoral system also with data from the World
Bank’s Database (Beck et al., 2001). Plurality systems are identified on the basis
of voting institutions in which legislators are elected using a ‘winner-takes-all’ rule.
Conversely, proportional representation systems are coded if candidates are elected
based on the percentage of votes received by their party, and/or if the World Bank’s
‘sources identified the respective electoral system as proportional representation’ (Beck
et al., 2001). Similar to the democratic government form variable, we created a binary
variable that takes on the value of 1 for plurality systems (Plurality Voting Dummy)
and 0 for proportional representation systems. Mixed electoral systems are omitted.
Finally, to model the effects of ENGO Leverage (ln) conditional on the moder-
ating variables of Presidential System Dummy and Plurality Voting Dummy, we
also consider multiplicative terms between (1) ENGO Leverage (ln) and
Presidential System Dummy; (2) ENGO Leverage (ln) and Plurality Voting Dummy;
(3) Presidential System Dummy and Plurality Voting Dummy; and (4) ENGO
Leverage (ln) and Presidential System Dummy and Plurality Voting Dummy. In other
words, we model a three-way interaction that we interpret below via the simple slope
difference tests (Dawson and Richter, 2006).
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Research design: control covariates
We use a wide range of control variables, most of which are also used in Bernauer
et al. (2010)11and other similar studies (Congleton, 1992; Frank, 1999; Fredriksson
and Gaston, 2000; Neumayer, 2002; Beron et al., 2003; Murdoch et al., 2003;
Roberts et al., 2004; Fredriksson et al., 2007; von Stein, 2008). First, we include a
country’s membership in international organizations (IO Membership), using the
number of international organizations of which a country is a member in a given
year (Pevehouse et al., 2004). A more extensive membership in international orga-
nizations (IOs) should increase the likelihood of states ratifying agreements that ‘lie
outside the scope of specific IOs they have joined at some prior time’ (Bernauer
et al., 2010: 514).
We also consider a country’s trade openness, measured as the ratio of the sum of
exports and imports to GDP (Trade Intensity). This variable reflects the actual and
perceived economic conditions and levels of insecurities associated with the vagaries
of the global market that might affect the chances to unleash changes in states’
environmental policies (Böhmelt and Vollenweider, 2014). According to Bernauer
et al. (2010: 518), the ‘tradeoff between gains from a cleaner environment and
losses from lower exports is more adverse for more open economies’. Hence, we
expect a negative impact of trade openness on treaty ratification. The data are taken
from Gleditsch (2002).
Third, we add a variable counting the total number of states in the international
system that already ratified the international environmental agreement in question
(Number of Countries Ratified). In addition, our estimations incorporate variables
capturing the percentage of countries from the same region (Percent of Region
Group Ratified) and the same income group that already ratified the international
environmental agreement in question (Percent of Income Group Ratified). The
variables Number of Countries Ratified, Percent of Region Group Ratified, and
Percent of Income Group Ratified are lagged by 1 year. The rationale behind these
variables pertains to international policy diffusion, that is a mechanism that ‘occurs
when government policy decisions in a given country are systematically conditioned
by prior policy choices made in other countries’ (Simmons et al., 2006: 787).
Fourth, we include income, measured as the log value of GDP per capita (GDP
per capita). We also include the squared value of this variable in light of the claims
of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (Seleden and Song, 1994; Grossman and
Krueger, 1995): the environment is a relatively low priority for states in the early
stages of development, but it becomes a higher priority as development increases.
The state of the domestic environment may also influence ratification behaviour.
Since we lack a composite index that reliably measures the quality of the environ-
ment at the domestic level, we use the log of SO2 emissions per capita (SO2 per
capita) as a proxy (Bernauer et al., 2010: 529). Arguably, these kinds of emissions
11 If not stated otherwise, the data for our control variables are taken from this source.
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are a very common form of air pollution and, thus, might reflect the overall
domestic environmental quality reasonably well.
Finally, we include the log of GDP (GDP). The reason for considering this last control
is that it captures the economic size or power of a state. More powerful countries might
be particularly reluctant to join international agreements as this could constrain their
sovereignty and autonomy in global governance (Bernauer et al., 2010: 529).
Empirical findings
Table 2 summarizes the main results of our empirical analysis. Model 1 focuses on
the core explanatory variables, while Model 2 includes the control covariates in
addition. The table entries are simple logit coefficients for which only the signs and the
standard errors can be interpreted directly. With regard to the constitutive terms of
the three-way interaction, however, note that we cannot even interpret the signs or
standard errors (Braumoeller, 2004; Brambor et al., 2006). Hence, we employ slope
difference tests (Dawson and Richter, 2006) to evaluate our theoretical argument, that
Table 2. Results from logistic regression models
Model 1 Model 2
ENGO Leverage (ln) 0.45 (0.05)*** 0.65 (0.09)***
Presidential System Dummy –0.56 (0.17)*** –1.78 (0.26)***
ENGO Presidential* –0.28 (0.10)*** 0.43 (0.14)***
Plurality Voting Dummy –0.83 (0.13)*** –0.43 (0.23)*
ENGO Plurality* 0.09 (0.06) –0.02 (0.11)
Presidential Plurality* 0.49 (0.26)* 2.50 (0.41)***
ENGO Presidential Plurality* 0.07 (0.12) –0.88 (0.18)***
IO Membership 0.02 (0.00)***
Trade Intensity –0.60 (0.09)***
Number of Countries Ratified –0.02 (0.00)***
Percent of Income Group Ratified 0.03 (0.00)***
Percent of Region Group Ratified 0.07 (0.00)***
GDP per capita 2.72 (1.11)**
GDP per capita –0.14 (0.06)**
SO2 per capita 0.05 (0.05)
GDP –0.44 (0.08)***
Ratification years variable 0.07 (0.03)** –0.39 (0.04)***
Spline 1 0.02 (0.00)*** 0.00 (0.00)*
Spline 2 –0.02 (0.00)*** –0.01 (0.00)***
Spline 3 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.00 (0.00)***
Constant –3.33 (0.09)*** –17.19 (4.98)***
Observations 75,051 63,532
Log pseudolikelihood –7,708.53 –5,039.36
Wald χ2 1,159.62*** 2,963.70***
Standard errors clustered on country-treaty pair in parentheses.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% (two-tailed).
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is we computed the difference in the average marginal effect of the ENGOs variable
conditional on Presidential System Dummy and Plurality Voting Dummy.
Table 3 shows that the impact of ENGOLeverage (ln) does indeed vary along the
two moderating variables. Most of the differences in the average marginal effects
are statistically different from each other and consistent across the model specifi-
cations. The only exceptions that point to strictly opposing directions according to
the models are ‘Parl./Plurality vs. Presid./Prop.Rep.’ and ‘Presid./Prop.Rep. vs.
Presid./Plurality’, whose effects apparently depend on estimation specifications.
Nonetheless, the results shown in Table 3 offer strong support for our argument
that the marginal ENGO effect is likely to vary across forms of government and the
type of electoral rule in democracies. Note that one of the largest differences
between the slopes is observable for the comparison of the ‘most extreme’ combi-
nations that we explicitly seek to study via our hypotheses: ‘Parl./Prop.Rep. vs.
Presid./Plurality’. Hence, regardless of model specifications, Table 3 shows that the
impact of ENGOs is stronger in parliamentary systems with a proportional repre-
sentation rule than in presidential democracies with plurality voting. In sum, these
slope difference tests provide some initial support for our two hypotheses.
To examine the effect of ENGOs conditional on the two moderating political
system variables in greater depth, we calculated the predicted probabilities of rati-
fication at different levels of ENGO Leverage (ln) according to the different sce-
narios outlined in Table 3. Figures 4 and 5 depict the findings: while Figure 4 covers
all four scenarios, Figure 5 omits the theoretically less relevant cases and focuses on
the pair-wise comparison of ‘Parl./Prop.Rep. vs. Presid./Plurality’. These figures
indicate that the impact of ENGOs on countries’ participation in international
environmental agreements is on average stronger in parliamentary than in pre-
sidential democracies. This finding is in line with our theoretical argument, which
holds that presidential systems tend to provide more public goods – including
environmental ones – than parliamentary systems, and that the marginal impact of
ENGOs should, therefore, be smaller in presidential systems.
Similarly, the ENGO effect is smaller in plurality voting systems, relative
to proportional representation systems. Finally, when looking at democratic
Table 3. Comparisons of differences in simple slopes of ENGO Leverage (ln)
Model 1: Contrasts Model 2: Contrasts
Parl./Prop.Rep. vs. Parl./Plurality 0.005* 0.005
Parl./Prop.Rep. vs. Presid./Prop.Rep. 0.014*** 0.003
Parl./Prop.Rep. vs. Presid./Plurality 0.012*** 0.014***
Parl./Plurality vs. Presid./Prop.Rep. 0.008*** –0.002
Parl./Plurality vs. Presid./Plurality 0.007*** 0.009***
Presid./Prop.Rep. vs. Presid./Plurality –0.001 0.011***
Bonferroni correction employed for P-values.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% (two-tailed).
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government type and electoral system in combination, we find again that the results
are in line with our theoretical expectations: as shown in Figure 5, the effect of
ENGO Leverage (ln) is noticeably stronger in parliamentary systems with
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Figure 4 The impact of environmental non-governmental organization (ENGO) leverage –
conditional on democratic system and electoral rule.
Note: The left panel pertains to Model 1. The right panel pertains to Model 2. The dashed lines
indicate 90% confidence intervals.
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Figure 5 The impact of environmental non-governmental organization (ENGO) leverage –
conditional on democratic system and electoral rule.
Note: The left panel pertains to Model 1. The right panel pertains to Model 2. The dashed lines
indicate 90% confidence intervals.
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proportional representation rule than in presidential democracies with plurality
voting. These effects are not only statistically significant, but also substantively
relevant. For instance, the probability of ratification in the average agreement-
country pair increases by about 10% when around 80 ENGOs are present in a
parliamentary system that relies on the proportional representation rule. However,
this probability drops to about 2.5% at the same level of ENGO leverage in a
presidential system with plurality voting. Ultimately, our empirical analysis provide
robust empirical support for our arguments that presidential systems with a plur-
ality electoral rule per se tend to provide more environmental public goods, which
induces a smaller marginal impact of ENGOs. Conversely, parliamentary systems
with a proportional representation electoral rule are likely to provide fewer
environmental public goods, but this allows for a larger marginal impact of ENGOs.
Coming to our control variables, the effects of IO Membership, Trade Intensity,
Percent of Income Group Ratified, Percent of Region Group Ratified, andGDP per
capita as well as its square term are all in line with results reported in the existing
literature on environmental treaty ratification. Membership in IOs significantly
increases the likelihood of ratification: when moving from the minimum to the
maximum value of this variable, the probability of ratification increases by about
1.5%. The same positive impact can be observed for the percentage of countries in
the same region and income group that have already ratified an environmental
agreement. When moving from the minimum to the maximum of Percent of Income
Group Ratified, we observe an increase in the likelihood of ratification by about
11%. The impact of Percent of Region Group Ratified is even stronger as it
increases the likelihood of treaty ratification by almost 57%. Hence, it appears that
more regionally based networks have a stronger influence.
We also find evidence for a curvilinear relationship between GDP per capita
and the probability of ratification, which reflects the patterns predicted by the
Environmental Kuznets Curve literature (Seleden and Song, 1994; Grossman and
Krueger, 1995). In our model, the turning point when growing income reverts from
decreasing the likelihood of treaty ratification to promoting it is located at around
$3318. Trade intensity reduces the likelihood of treaty ratification, although this effect
is substantively small. When moving from the minimum to the maximum value of this
variable, the probability of treaty ratification decreases by only around 1.3%.
In contrast to, for example, Bernauer et al. (2010), we find that ratification by the
average country becomes less likely when a larger share of all other countries has
already ratified (about 1% when increasing Number of Countries Ratified from its
minimum to its maximum value). One potential reason for this difference could be that
our sample excludes non-democratic countries, while Bernauer et al. (2010) examine all
states globally. Finally, the impact of a country’s economic power is negative and just
significant, while domestic environmental conditions as captured by SO2 per capita do
not seem to affect the likelihood of treaty ratification substantially.
To assess the robustness of our findings, we used other statistical approaches, and
also re-ran the models using alternative data for the ENGO variable and data for the
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effective number of parties. These robustness checks are summarized in the online
appendix (Supplementary Material). The findings from these alternative model
specifications support the results reported here.
Conclusion
The existing literature offers useful theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on
whether and how ENGOsmay influence environmental public goods provision. But
it provides only limited insights into whether and in what respect the influence of
ENGOs on governments’ environmental policies may be contingent on particular
characteristics of the political system.
In this paper, we developed a theoretical framework in three steps. First, we
connected fundamental political system characteristics, that is the form of govern-
ment and the type of electoral rule, with levels of public goods provision. Second, we
added a characterization of the nature of electoral competition to this model, as
expressed by the effective number of parties. Third, we placed ENGOs into this
setup. The impact of ENGOs on the provision of environmental public goods –
measured by countries’ ratification behavior vis-à-vis 250 international environ-
mental agreements – was then conceptualized as being contingent on democratic
government type and electoral rule.
This theoretical approach for explaining the impact of ENGOs on environmental
public goods provision connects two hitherto separate streams in the literature: the
comparative politics literature on interest groups, non-governmental organizations,
and social movements, which highlights the importance of political opportunity
structures; and, second, the political economy literature, which inter alia offers
arguments on the provision of public goods as a function of political system char-
acteristics. Our empirical findings offer strong support for the argument that the
impact of ENGOs is likely to be stronger in parliamentary systems with a propor-
tional representation rule, relative to presidential systems with plurality voting.
From a normative perspective that places hope in ENGOs to push governments
towards more ambitious environmental policies, our results offer quite good news.
First and foremost, our research suggests that ENGO lobbying efforts are not
without any effect. In fact, while the ENGO effect differs significantly across poli-
tical system types, it remains positive even in those democratic systems where we
expect the effect to be weaker. By identifying such an overall net impact of ENGOs,
our study complements the existing literature, which offers such evidence in more
idiosyncratic form for specific environmental policy areas, countries, and points in
time. That said, given the differences in ENGO influence across political system
types, ENGOs might also try to make their lobbying more effective by identifying in
the first place those democratic system types that may be more open towards their
preferences and positions.
Further research building on the work reported in this paper could focus on
several issues. First, as noted above, ratification of international environmental
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treaties is an important, but clearly not the only proxy for levels of environmental
public goods provision. Future research could thus test our arguments on additional
data. Major data gaps will have to be overcome to that end, however. For instance,
the Environmental Performance Index, one of the most popular multi-country
measures of environmental performance, is available only for a limited number of
years and, to some extent, changes composition over time. Also, its components
measuring policy stringency are much less elaborated than its components on
environmental quality or polluting behaviour. In any event, to the extent that
available data allow it, it will be interesting to explore whether contingent ENGO
effects differ across policy output and environmental outcomes. Recent work
suggests, for instance, that democracy has a positive effect on the willingness
of countries to commit to more ambitious environmental policies, but that the
‘words-deeds’ gap is particularly large for such political systems (e.g. Bättig and
Bernauer, 2009; see also Aichele and Felbermayr, 2012).
Second, we have used the arguably best available data on ENGOs, given our
needs for data that cover many democracies and a reasonably long time-period –
with one dataset used for the main analysis, and an alternative dataset used for
robustness checks (see Supplementary Material). These data are somewhat incom-
plete, though, and using the mere number of ENGOs as a proxy for ENGOs’
political leverage does not take into account differences in the distribution of
political leverage across ENGOs within a country. Ideally, future data collection
efforts should fill this gap and try to construct more sophisticated measures using
information on membership size and resources of ENGOs.
Finally, while our quantitative setup has the advantage that we are able to identify a
general pattern under which conditions ENGOs might exert an influence on environ-
mental politics, we cannot claim causality. Put differently, our work can show that
associations or correlations exist between our key variables of interest, but it would be
misleading to interpret the ‘marginal impact’ in this paper as causal. Hence, it could be
useful to conduct more qualitative research, stakeholder surveys, or network analyses
of ENGOs and governmental actors in a set of countries that differ with respect to
political system type and electoral rule. Such work could seek to identify in greater
detail whether, in the self-assessment of ENGOs and from the perspective of govern-
ment actors, the (aggregate) marginal impact of ENGOs on environmental policy
making is in fact larger in parliamentary systems with proportional electoral rule.
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